Police Use of Dogs to Sniff Vehicle For Drugs Unconstitutional
The Supreme Court holds that absent reasonable suspicion, police extension
of a traffic stop in order to conduct a dog sniff is unconstitutional . . .
(Taken from the syllabus prepared by the Reporter of Decisions)
DENNYS RODRIGUEZ v. UNITED STATES, No. 13–9972
Argued January 21, 2015
Decided April 21, 2015
GINSBURG, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ROBERTS, C. J.,
and SCALIA, BREYER, SOTOMAYOR, and KAGAN, JJ., joined. KENNEDY, J., filed a
dissenting opinion. THOMAS, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which ALITO,
J., joined, and in which KENNEDY, J., joined as to all but Part III. ALITO,
J., filed a dissenting opinion.
Officer Struble, a K–9 officer, stopped petitioner Rodriguez for driving on
a highway shoulder, a violation of Nebraska law. After Struble attended to
everything relating to the stop, including, inter alia, checking the
driver’s licenses of Rodriguez and his passenger and issuing a warning for
the traffic offense, he asked Rodriguez for permission to walk his dog
around the vehicle. When Rodriguez refused, Struble detained him until a
second officer arrived. Struble then retrieved his dog, who alerted to the
presence of drugs in the vehicle. The ensuing search revealed
methamphetamine. Seven or eight minutes elapsed from the time Struble
issued the written warning until the dog alerted.
Rodriguez was indicted on federal drug charges. He moved to suppress the
evidence seized from the vehicle on the ground, among others, that Struble
had prolonged the traffic stop without reasonable suspicion in order to
conduct the dog sniff. The Magistrate Judge recommended denial of the
motion. He found no reasonable suspicion supporting detention once Struble
issued the written warning. Under Eighth Circuit precedent, however, he
concluded that prolonging the stop by “seven to eight minutes” for the dog
sniff was only a de minimis intrusion on Rodriguez’s Fourth Amendment
rights and was for that reason permissible. The District Court then denied
the motion to suppress. Rodriguez entered a conditional guilty plea and was
sentenced to five years in prison. The Eighth Circuit affirmed. Noting that
the seven or eight minute delay was an acceptable “de minimis intrusion on
Rodriguez’s personal liberty,” the court declined to reach the question
whether Struble had reasonable suspicion to continue Rodriguez’s detention
after issuing the written warning.
Held: Absent reasonable suspicion, police extension of a traffic stop in
order to conduct a dog sniff violates the Constitution’s shield against
unreasonable seizures.
1. A routine traffic stop is more like a brief stop under Terry v. Ohio,
392 U. S. 1, than an arrest, see, e.g., Arizona v. Johnson, 555 U. S. 323,
330. Its tolerable duration is determined by the seizure’s “mission,” which
is to address the traffic violation that warranted the stop, Illinois v.
Caballes, 543 U. S. 405, 407 and attend to related safety concerns.
Authority for the seizure ends when tasks tied to the traffic infraction
are—or reasonably should have been—completed. The Fourth Amendment may
tolerate certain unrelated investigations that do not lengthen the roadside
detention, Johnson, 555 U. S., at 327–328 (questioning); Caballes, 543 U.
S., at 406, 408 (dog sniff), but a traffic stop “become[s] unlawful if it
is prolonged beyond the time reasonably required to complete th[e] mission”
of issuing a warning ticket, id., at 407.
Beyond determining whether to issue a traffic ticket, an officer’s mission
during a traffic stop typically includes checking the driver’s license,
determining whether there are outstanding warrants against the driver, and
inspecting the automobile’s registration and proof of insurance. These
checks serve the same objective as enforcement of the traffic code:
ensuring that vehicles on the road are operated safely and responsibly. See
Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U. S. 648, 658–659. Lacking the same close
connection to roadway safety as the ordinary inquiries, a dog sniff is not
fairly characterized as part of the officer’s traffic mission.
In concluding that the de minimis intrusion here could be offset by the
Government’s interest in stopping the flow of illegal drugs, the Eighth
Circuit relied on Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U. S. 106. The Court reasoned
in Mimms that the government’s “legitimate and weighty” interest in officer
safety outweighed the “de minimis” additional intrusion of requiring a
driver, lawfully stopped, to exit a vehicle, id., at 110–111. The
officer-safety interest recognized in Mimms, however, stemmed from the
danger to the officer associated with the traffic stop itself. On-scene
investigation into other crimes, in contrast, detours from the officer’s
traffic-control mission and therefore gains no support from Mimms.
The Government’s argument that an officer who completes all traffic-related
tasks expeditiously should earn extra time to pursue an unrelated criminal
investigation is unpersuasive, for a traffic stop “prolonged beyond” the
time in fact needed for the officer to complete his traffic-based inquiries
is “unlawful,” Caballes, 543 U. S., at 407. The critical question is not
whether the dog sniff occurs before or after the officer issues a ticket,
but whether conducting the sniff adds time to the stop. Pp. 5–8.
2. The determination adopted by the District Court that detention for the
dog sniff was not independently supported by individualized suspicion was
not reviewed by the Eighth Circuit. That question therefore remains open
for consideration on remand. P. 9.
741 F. 3d 905, vacated and remanded.